In rhc area of civil Liberties, the American framers bequeathed a dual legacy. On the one hand, they authored and ratified constitutions wirh strikingly open-ended guarantees concerning the fm:dom of srccch, the freedom of religion, the right ro trial by jury, and various aspectS of criminal procedure. On the other hand, the same Americans who spoke of "inalienable" righrs endorsed a range of inherittd laws and customary practices char shar;>ly limired rhe practical consequences of these abstr:act guarantees. MOSt of the newly independent states enforced laws againsr blasphemy, for example, cvci as thdr conStirunons promised to respect the freedom of speech. Many scares also criminalized Sunday labor and barred non·Proresranrs from holding office, even as rheir constirutions prohibited religious establi>hments and promised to respect rhe freedom of religion. And virrually no one involved in the drafting of the state or federal constitutions believed rhat civil liberries provisions indicated any change in the legal status of slaves, women, or orher subordinate classes of Americans.
There can he little doubt that the a uthors of Founding·~:ra rights provisions sincerely hoped ro protect citizens from the sons of abuS<.'S -from warrantless searches ro rhc forced quarrering of soldiers -thar had transformed the imperial ctisi< inro a revolution. Bur most of them were equally dcrermined to guard against the colla~ of customary forms of authority rhar they dttmed essential ro social stability. Thus, while civil liberties prinaplcs certainly playtd a a:nttal role in the American Revolution, it is noc at all dear mar chcy occupied a prccmincnr position in the constitutional order that emerged in its afterrnarh. Far from elevating civil liberties above inhcrittd forms of authority, the founding generation superimposed the former on rhc latrer, leaving it ro future generations to work out the precise nature of the re.ulting relationships.
This chapter will argue that the framers' dual legacy in the arcd of civil liberties has cnst a long historical shadow. Since the early republic:, Americans have invoked consritutional civil liberties provisions to challenge cusromary forms of a uthority. Yet establishing theabstraer legitimacy ofone's claim-that it comporrs wirh a particula r concepticon o f religious liberty or the freedom of pil Liberties and the Dual Legacy of the Founding 73 ..,-ch, for e"ample -has typically been insufficient to prevail in the courts: In ,ddiuon, rights claimant:s have regularly ~n asked _ w overcome a compenng
•of normative commlhnenrs-ro federalism, ro patnarchal family relanons, to -1iglously inspiml social mores -thar give entrenched authority its own 4iorinct claim to consrirutional kgitimacy. The mOSt obvious practical eff~t fl dus duality, particularly in the early ytars of the republic, was the frtquenr _.i,ordmation of civil liberties ro illiberal forms of authority. Yet even as illiberal aurhority structures bave eroded over time, the framers' dual lcgacy ... conti nued ro shape constitutional d(velopmcnt in ways both subtle and pcofound.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that even as Americans have adopted ever more IXP"ll)ive conceptions of particular consritutional liberties, they have cominued io disagrec, often bitterly, about precisely which forms of inherited auchority are so arbitrary or oppressive as to run afoul of rhcsc guarantees. 111ey have also disagreed, just as bitterly, over the srare' s proper role in mitigating the social lllld polirictl effects of illiberal social authority. Should civil liberties provisions be ttgarckd as purely negative guarantees, offering prorcction against government .aion only, and thus not incompatible with MJCial arraogement:s that, while illiberal, arc nor clearly underpinned by official auchority? Alternatively, do Jl'>vernmcnr actors ha"" an affumatirc duty ro dismantle inherited social llNCIUttS char render civil liberties aU bur meanin8Jcss foc some citizens? And if u:h an obligation aists, how does one cakularc (and justify) the resulting tnidcoffs bctwttn liberty and equality? Lf consensus on these questions has provtd elusive, ir is ar least in part because the Constitution, owing to irs dual • ture, cannot settle the matter.
This chapter divides the history of civil liberties into four periods. The first lection covers the period from the founding through the late nineteenth century -a cirnc when a broad moral consensus roote<I in Protestant Christianity was said to demarcate a bow1dary b<.-tween "liberty" and "license" and when open-ended civil liberties provisions were rarely interpreted in ways that undermined customa ry pettems of authority. The second section e>eamincs the early decades of the tMnticth century, a ttansforrnative period whci the collapse of the Proresrant moral consensus, together with the rise of social movement:s bent on undermining emrmched hierarchies, left the traditional 1hcory of ovil liberties in ratters. The chapter's third section documenrs rhe emergence, in the middle decades puaoteeS while simultaneously insisting that \.atholics be barred from public dfices and blasphemy punished as a crime? Two broadly shared convictions llloMd Americans tO proclaim allegiance ro the idea of civil liberties while lialulraneously embrocing inherited social srn1erurcs that sharply limited the rcalworld effects of these written guarantees. First, ir was widely agtCed that republican pemmcnt was unlikely to survive in the absence of a morally virtuous citizenry.
• from this it followed that a Prorestant-derivcd moral consensus marked, or ought ID mark, ~ boundary between liberty and license. Second, e•en as Americans tailnced the 1..-JCkean language of natural rights, the enduring force of the cunmon law ensured that they would continue to view their own society in llroadly hierarchical t.erms. Thus James Kent and other early American legal _,,,.,.uarors depicted a society composed nor of coequal rights-bearing citizens bur of legally enforceable relationships featuring dominant and subordinate panncrs: husbands and wives, masters and servants, guardfans and waids.1 To the limited extent that these writers addressed the tension between inherited legal prerogatives and rhc Lockean ideal of universal rights, they insisted that the very poliibiliry of republican government presumed a well-<>rdered society. And a weU- • Ah:hougb. James M;id1wn arguably bt.hcvcd that a well'"<lcsigncd constttu11on01I $f$tem could rhn't't e'len in lhc • AA Wilham Novak hou: put the potnr, the particular bundle o( rights to which a ninetecn:th-ttncury American could lay <.la11n W<l" "'highly patticulari1.cd lanJJ t.kpend<'RI upon lanl individual's ptraonal pattern of residence. juriMikdon, office. juh, tiervk't, organi1.1trion 1 :bsociacton. fomily J)Oliuoo, age, 1tender, race. and c:apadty.
• "'The Legal Traosform1rion of Cir.iunship in N1nnttnth.C.U1wy America,• in _\1ta Jacobs, WillU.m J. Novak.
•nd Jtilian E. al12<r, «!.., 
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To see this morali1,ed and pariiculnrized conception of rights in action, we need only examine a few illustrative cases involving religious liberty and the freedom <)f the press. Consider the case o f john Ruggle.,,, a resident of New York who in 18u appealed his blasphemy conviction to his •tatc'• highest court. At first glaoce, Ruggles had a strong case. He pointed out that New York's coostitution guar.uueed the freedom of conscience and barred the establishment of an official religion. Moreover, bla>phcmy was not explicitly mentioned as a criminal act in any Statute enacred by the state legislature. And yL'f Judge James Kenc, in the face of these apparently mirig.1ring facts, affirmed Rugglc.'s conviction. Although Kent acknowledged that New Yorlc had "discarded religious establishments,• he insisred that it had not repealed rhose pam of the common law that served to "inculcate moral discipline" and "bind society together. " 7 Blasphemy would conrinue to be punished as a crime in New York not because it offended "the rights of the church• but because it "tcnd[ed] to corrupt the morals of the people, aod to destroy (the) good order" that was the esseotial prttcquisite of republican government.* If the rights of conscience belonged in the first instance to Protestant Christians, the duties that corresponded to these rightl> fell disproportionately on nonbelievers aod religious minorities. This was nowhere more evident than in early appellate cases involving Sunday labor. In Commonwealth v. Wo/f (1817), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed a Jewish tradesman's constitutional objections to a state law that criminaliud nonessential labor on the Christian Sabbath. Although the state's constitution guaranteed the free exercise of religion, the Court reasoned that Wolfs rights had not bL-cn infringed, since nothing in (its reading of) the Jewish sacred texrs commanded Jew;, to labor on Sundays. Wolf was free to forego labor on Saturdays, but rhe srnrc constitution did not guarantee his right to make up for lost time hy working on the day when "the great mass" of the state's citizens believed God had commanded them to rcst. 9 An 1886 dcx:ision of the Georgia Supreme Court employed the s.imc line of reasoning, noting that prntcttions for religious liberry would be but "paper guarantees, unless protected and enfore<!<l hy legal sanction•," including Sunday closing laws, that ensured a quiet and wholesome environment for "religious worship.'" 0 7 People v. Rugg.lei, 8 John~. 190. 196, 194 For Taney, it was simply "impossible ro believe" that che Southern framers "could have been so forgetful or regardless of cheir own safety" as to endorse the existence of rights whose contours were unaffected by their impact upon preexisring authority structures. '
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One finds the same line of reasoning in countless ninctecnrh-ccntury cases where an asserted constitutional right of free speech collided with entrenched social hierarchies. Aurhority relations within the family, for example, remained largely unaffected by developments in the realm of constituriona I law. Women in the early republic were regularly prevented from speaking in public, particularly to mixed audiences. Sa11e and federal obscenity laws-known as Comstock Laws, afttt their chief proponent -barred discussion of comraceprion and fumily planning. And although women raise:<! constitutional objections to these restrictions (and many others), their picas typically fdl on deaf cars. As justice Joseph P. Bradley explained in r 873, in a case involving the Illinois s1a1e bar's refUS:tl 10 admit a woman, "the law of the Creator" had decreed char women were 10 enjoy only those rights that were essemial to " fulfill[ing] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."" Nor did civil liberties provisions significantly interfere with a111hority relations in the workplace. As nineteenth-century workers who invoked the frccdom of speech in defense of the right to organize quickly discovered, the legal prerogatives of the employer trumped -or rather defined the limits ofthe constitutional rights of the employee. ' 8 In some cases, employers and antiunion officia ls suppressed labor organi2.ing by relying on ordinances that " 6o U.S. J9J, 416-1 7 (•8s7 (New York: Cambr1dg1: University Pres~ t99t), 9 2. A" Orren purs the point, '1'be employee lived in a divided Polnical world. One St'<.'tiOn was governed hy puhftc reprcscnNtivcs of his own choosing., i1l rituals festooned and celebrated with the b:allyhoo or party politics, f!«>pled by silvcr·congucd oralors and war heroes. The other was sealed off from the public, disciplined and drab, irt governance located fin.ally in the somber and mystifying routines o( the courtroom.,. ~ucet speaking to certain (typically inconvenient) times and places. In they arrested organizers on vague charges that included vagrancy and mg the peace. But the most powerful tool in the anti-union arsenal was i.tior injunction: a court order rhat en1oined workers and organiurs from · ng, boycotting, or otherwise interfering with the operations of a · tar business. Although constitutional free spc«h provisions were ;..rauy understood to bar "prior rcsrrainrs~ of speech, judges reasoned char Jidlor ,dcmonstr.ttions, b~ threa_tening the cmployer'.s property i_nterest in the ,.-ccful operation of his busmess, crossed the lme that divided peaceful f!dY<>' •CY from ha rmful conduct.•• The Union victory in the Civil War is often described as marking a fundamental ~ in American thinking about constirnrional rights. It is certainly true chat JJncoln and his fellow Republicans vehemently contested justice Taney's ,..ertion that the preservation of slavery trumped all constitutional claims that ,iight he asserted on behalf of free blacks or other residents of free states and .,ntories. Moreover, by the war's end, most northL-m An1ericans were convinced dilr chattel slavery was an affront to rhe ideals of libcrry and equality. And to ~slavery's demise, all agreed, ir would he necessary to nationalize at I~~ IOIDt constitutional rights. Thus, the Fourteenth AmendmL"llt, adopced in 1868, _.t Congress and tbe couns with the formal authority to ensure tha1 no stare denied 1b residents equal protection of rhe laws; deprived them of life, liberty, or property without due process; or ~bridged the "privileges and immuni~" of US cilixns-But while tbe Rcconsrrucnon amendments granted a measure of liberty to die former slaves, they did not fundamcnrnlly airer the definition of liberty itsell.
Indeed, many of rhe same commcnrators who denounced slavery as a moral evil remained steadfastly supporrive of the legally enforced hierarchies that ordered the home and the workplace. Many of tbem also envisioned a future
In which African Americans and other racia l minorities would occupy a 1Ubordinate position in society. And nearly everyone agreed that traditional andards of personal morality should continue co delimit the bou ndary between liberty and license. Thus, Thomas M. Cooley reminded readers of his influential Co11stitutiona/ Limitations that rhe right to publish true staremenrs concerning public affairs did not protect one who published a factually accurate account of a criminal trial where rhe sub1cet matter was "such as ro make ir improper that the proettdings should be spread before the public, because of their immoral tendency, or of the blasphemous or indecent character of the eYidcnce exhibited." Nor did religious liberty provisions proicet citizens who Ar the same time that the i111151on of moral consensus was crumbling, vanous poups of oursiders were beginning to detach rhe Constinition's civil liberties provisions from their rradicional moorings in cusrom and common law. lleimagined as abstract guarantees, civil liberties could be turne:I against the _,-social struaurcs that had long been rhoughr to mark the outer limits of illldiY1dual libert) in a republican society.Jews and Catholics, for example, bqµn IO use constitutional arguments to oppose Protestant prosclyti1jng in the public llChools. In several states, elected officials responded by d irl'<.'ting public funds to perochial schools, thus implicitly endorsing the right of Catholic children to nai>'C a publicly funded education that did not conflict wirh the reners of their flith."' Morcovtt, five state judJciaries -most of them in states with signi/icant C.ul1vli< popula1iono -had by 19~0 declared thot Prorest:int Bible readjng in the public schools amounted to an unconstirutiona l establishment of religion. Around the same time, labor activists began ro exchange polarizing appeals to class struggle for the more anodyne language of civil liberties. ' 8 In the early ' 92os, the novelist and labor organizer Up1011 Sinclair declared that there was "one platform upon which it should be possible to gel every true American" to stand with labor "for rhe purpose of bringing about industrial changes.
• That platform was "free discussion,• an "ideal ... carefully embodied by our forefathers in the fundamental law of our nation and of every one of our separate states.••• In • 92.0, a group of attorneys and academics with prolabor sympathies formed the nation's lir;,r major civil libenies organization, the American Civil Libenies Union (ACLU), with the primary aim of securing constitutional prorecrion for pickets, OO)'COrts, and other organizing activities.
In conjunction with rhe Industrial Workers of the World (!WW) and other groups from the labor movement's radical wing, the ACLU worked to reframc anti-organizing measures a~ affronts to the constitutional liberties of average Americans. 10 A panicularly successful strategy involved having labor activists who were barred from speaking under local ordinances or injunctions read the Bill of Rights in a public semng, such as a park, with the aim of being arrested. The jailing of citizen• whoo;c only apparenr crime was 10 read the Constitution aloud in public led many Americans to conclude !hat constitutional rights were, in foct, at stake on both sides of the picket line.''
The racial order was also undergoing unpreccdcmed changes as large nunibers of African American~ began to migrate northward in search of greaier economic opportunity in the nation's urban centers. Wiih expanded economic opportunity came the growth of an African American middle class, which in turn facilitated rhc founding of organizations, such as the NAACP, that were dedicated tO puhlicizing the evils of segregation and funding legal cha llenges to Jim Crow.J• In addition, the sudden enfra nchisement of large numhers of African Americans, many of 1hem concentrated in a handful of lfDl-s and Brandeis, writing in dissent, argued that restrictions on political lpleCh should be upheld only in the event of a "dear and prt'SCnt danger" to.an 111portant governmental interest -something that was lacking in cases hke Abrams v. U.S. (1919) , where the speaker in question had, according to Holmes, merely thrown a few "silly" anarchist leaflets from a Manhattan sooftop."
Arguably more important rhan this doctrinal innovation, however, was the 11a1lar theory of political society 011 which it was based. In sharp contrast to llinefeenrh ·cenrury commentators, Holmes doubled that it was possible, on the .. sis of objective crireria, 10 distinguish morally worthy ideas from those that ~ false or dangerous. American sociery, after all, was currently riven by moral disagreement. And the problem of identifying objective mora l principles became even more vexing when one considered the evolution of moral ideas Oftr time. American history was replete with examples of activities and fo rms of property-from slavery to liquor to lotteries -that were widely accepted or even oelebratcd in one era only to be condemned as immoral in the next (or vice wna). 1 ' When one considered that "time haldl upset many fighting faiths,• it -unclear why notions of morality should play any role at all in the process of constitutiona l inrerpreialion.3 7 &ner, Holmes reasoned, to interpret the Consiitution without regard to 1he historical "accident of our finding certain opinions natural aod familiar or novel and even shocking.
•3 1 Bur how would judges delimit the boundaries of free speech, if not by reference to broadly shared mores? Drawing on an argument lirsr advanced by the English philosopher John Stuart Mill, Holmes answered that there was no need for lawmakers or judges to concern themselves with the social effects of particular ideas or creeds. Indeed, censorship was counterproductive, since governmenis were so ofien misraken in their judgmentS abou1 which ideas were so dangerou~ or wrongheaded as 10 justify suppression. And in an open exchange of views, ideas that were socially beneficial would generally triumph over those rhac were false or dangerous. "IT]he bes1 test of iruth," Holmes asserted, was "the power of the thoughr to get itself accepted in rhe competition of rhc marker."" Brandeis, in addition to endorsing Holmes's "marketplace" theory of speech, proposed r. har civil lihcrti<-s provisions were fundamentally concemt '<I with protecting individual autonomy. The framers of rhe Bill of RightS, he wrote in an oft-quoted dissent, hoped ro "secure conditions favorable ro che pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings, and of his intcllea ... "They sought ro protect Arncricnn, in their beliefs, their thoughts, !heir emotions and their sensations. They conferred ... the right to be let alone -the most comprehensive of rights, and rhc righr most valued by civili~ men."'° Nineteenth-cenrury commentarors thus had the relarionsbip between conventional morality and republican government exactly backward: to teach 1hcir fuU potential, what citizens most needed was not the moral tutelage of the law bur rather a constirutionally prorected privare sphere. In addition, an expand'xl t"Onccption of civil liberties would hcnefit society by allowing citizens to boldly ns_scrt their views -whatever they might happen to be -in the public arena, rhereby developing their deliberative faculties and stimulating others to do the s.1me. Ir was not rbe heterodox thinker who was rhe "menace to freedom," but rather the "inert" citizen who blindly conformed to inhcriled mores. 4 ' Although the Holmes and Brandeis dissents stimu lated a great deal of discussion in academic circles, few of their fellow justices expressed much enthusiasm for the idea rhar couns should adopt a more asserlive srance in civil liberties cases. To be sure, a majority of the Court held for the 6m time in Cir/ow v. New York ( 1925) mcnt.'' But even as the Court "i11corporated" 1he first Amendmem's IPC«h clause, ii declined to expand the substantive definition of "free ... J and intellectual eli= were similarly ambivalenL Conservative tators, while supportive of judicially enforced economic rights, ly opposed enhanttd pr?rection for civil li~rties, at least :Where the 00 question could be claimed by labor organizers.•• Progressives, while ly supportive of labor organi2ing, were skeptical of ane'."ptS to expand auihority at a time when the coum seemed reflexively hostile to ic regulation.
• • The latter group was particularly alarmed by a string of 5 in which the Cowct had blocked attempts to tl'gulate rhe wages and of workers. In the most nowrious of these rulings, Lochner v. New York S), the Court found that a Jaw limiting rhc working hours of bakery yees was nm a legitimate hea~th or safety regul!ti<m bu! rather. an itutional interference wllh the liberiy of contract, a liberty ostensibly in the Fourteenth Amendmenl's due process clause. 46 If the justices simply reading their laissez-faire policy preferences into the Fowcreenrh nr -and progressives were convinced this was case -then ii made ICflSC 10 provide the Coun with yet another doctrinal tool that could be used diwart me will of democratic majorities. augment rhe Coun's aurhority at a moment when the Democraric Party had stranglehold on rhe levers of lcgislarive aurhoriry.• 8 Morco•-er, even if ~ reconstituted _Court could be rrusted to interpret !he Constitution in ways that comported wuh the prograrnnuric goals of the Democratic regime, ir was unclear how, at the level of doctrine, !he jusoces could simultaneously devalue economic rights and expand civil liberties protections. To many observers, including futurt Supreme Court Jusrice Felix Frankfurter, it seemed that the wiser SL1noe was an across·the· board polky of judicial deference.
justice Harlan Fiske Stone's majority opinion in U.S. v. Cnrolene Products ( 1938) pointed rhe way out of this theoretical thickct. 49 In the opinion's famous Foornote Four, Stone offered a pair of theories to explain why an expansive conccpnon of civil liberties was not incompatible wirh a deferential approach to economic regulation. First, he poinred out rhat the individual righrsenshrined in the "first ten amendments" had a firmer basis in the text than economic due process rights. Where che early-rwentieth-cenrury Court had relied on a series of judicially created doctrines -including the "liberry of contract" -to o bstruct the rise of rhe regulato ry state, the post-New Deal Court would confine its scrminy of democratically enacted laws to those thllt violated textually grounded righrs, including the freedoms of speech and religion. Second, Stone noted that in casc-s where the democrntic process had been corrupted or where "discrete and insular minoritiet." had been singled out for negative treatment, judicial enforcement of individual rights could not fairly be described as undermining dem~ratic principles. True, rhe exercise of judicial revitw in such cases would have the effect of overturning laws that reflected (ar least superficially) the will of the majoriry, but in so doing the Court would be preserving the imegrity of the underlying democratic system -something that could nor be said of the prc~New Deal Court's decisions inva lidating broadly popular economic regulations.
When combined with the earlier opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, Stone's C'.nrolene Products footnote provided rhe blueprint for a radically new approach ro civil liberties. Instead of relying on inherited mores or religious views to mark the boundary between liberty and license, the Court would now read the Constitution's civil liberties provisions as demanding maximum scope for the free play of ideas and the self-development of individual cirizens. And instead of assuming that longstanding inegalitarian features of American sociery were essential to the survival of republican government and thus deserving of judicial deference, the Court would take a skeptical view of laws that worked to the disadvantage of "d iscrete and insular minorities." For the next three decades, the . First Amendment and other civil liberties provisions would bent their most potent in precisely those cases that justice Taney and the '' On orpn1ztd labor's skepctca.I attatude 1owards r:hc judiciary, xc WcllU'tb, •CiV11 Ubtrties outsKkmeCoum,• ,,,_,,. " J04 U.S. •H (1U8).
Scort majority had rejected as ~impossible" to take seriously -that is, pitting marginalized citi•ens against encreoched patte ms of state and local ·ry.
a1GllTS REVOLUTION, i 938-t973 the late i 93os and the c.uly 197os, the Supreme Court presided o~cr a revolution" that stood the nineteenth-century theory of rhe co nst1tut1onal on irs head. By the end of rhis period, it was genera lly accepted tha_ t the of speech, the free exercise of religion, and most of the other 1Dd1~1dua l enshrined in rhe Bill of Rights were ( 1) enjoyed equally by all Amencans;
· on all levels of govcrnmenr; and (3) more or less inviolable, save in the of a compelling ihre:u to public saftty or basic govem~n~l fun~ons. The effect of the new way of minking was to elevate ovil h~es dauns above cradirionally superior claims of domestic and local authority. Long relegated 1 peripheral position in American consritutional law, civil liberties now became • fixed star" around which rhe constitutional system was said to revolve.
• •
If a single decision ca n be said to epitomize the Court's .new approach to CIVIi ·es ir is West Virgilrin v. Barnette, a r943 case involv111g a group of ah's Wimess children who were expelled from public school for refusing u lure the flag.'' Only three years before, the Court, in an opinion by j ustice fnnJcfurter, had upheld a similar compulsory Oag salute _la~ on !he gr_o. unds
•r efforts to promote a patriorie cirizellfY were ~veil_ within rhe i_r.idmonal llounds of state and local authoriry. Finr he denied that the scope of the Constitution's civil liberties guarantees was m lllY ;..,.y afft.'Cted by the admittedly "delicate and highly discr<.'tion;irr functio~s. · of local government. Perhaps he was thinking of the Witnesses well-pubhcizcd 1nvails. Or perhaps he was thinking of seve:ral recent cases mat had draw_ o -.hon to orber abuses of local authority, including the routine denial of basic aiminal procedure protections ro Souchem blacks and the use of facially neutral licensing schemes to obstruC'l labor organizing."' Jn any event, jac~n concluded dw "small and local authority," far from serving as the essennal guardian of cirittns' liberties, was comparatively more likely than national authority to threaren rhcm. Instead of deferring to the cdim of "village tyrants," the Coun would henceforth be especially diligent in scrutinizing their activities.H Second, Jackson laid to rest che ninereenrh-ccnrury undemanding of the relationship between religious and moral orrhodoxy on the one hand and republican government on the other. In sharp conrrast to James Kent and the countless nineteenth-century commentators who had defended che constitutionality of blasphemy laws, Jackson's reading of history indicated that arrempts to achieve "[c)ompulsory unification of opinion" in matters of religion were destined to fail or else to achieve "only the unanimity of the gra vcyard.
• Nor was there any credible evidence to suggest that allowing citizens the "freedom to be intellecrnally and spiritually diverse" would "disintegrate the social organization. "S 6 Henceforth, the J'irst Amendment would be understood to require that common convictions be arrived at volu ntarily or nor at all.
But if Barnette indicated that the Court would not hesitate to dismantle entrenched authority in the name of universal righrs, it provided lirde in the way of a brooder theory that might delineate a new boundary between individual liberty and official authoriry. Unable to invoke the idea of a sock-ry-wide moral consensus for this purpose, the mid<rntury Court relied instead on Holmcs's marketplace metaphor and Brandeis's autonomy ideal The marketplace metaphor provided the rationale for a series of decisions that effectivdy stripped stare and local governments of their longstanding authoriry to regulate public discourse. Laws punishing subversive speech were now unconstitutiunal in the absence of a "clear and present danger" to an important governmental interest (or, in rhe later, more stringent formulation, where the speaker seemed likely to unleash "imminent lawless violence")." Laws that indirectly restricted speech in the interest of public safery or convenience had to be narrowly tailored and neutral with rcsp<."<."t to the viewpoint of the speaker. Requiring licenses of speakers was permissible in certain limited cases (as when a group sought to hold a parade on a busy public street), bur license laws were to be purely administrative in nature, leaving officials powerless to discriminate against particular ideas or speakers.'
1
The Court's critics-including internal ones like Frankfurter-warned that che new docrrincs would leave states and municipaliries powerless to combat the social unrest char inevitably accompanied extremist speech making. But a majoriry of the justices were willmg to run the risk of occasional disorder if in so doing they prev~ted an even greater evil -namely, the "srancbrdizatioo of ideas" by "dominant political or community groups.
•s• '' In adchrton. jackJ()fl reasoned th.ar consrirunoo41J V1olanoru: ar rht lool lcvcl "~more ljkdy acapc ckrccuoo, \in« rhc '"agents of publiciry"' were rypteally ~, d1l1gent in reporting on them.
)19 U.S. 
· J.iberties and the Dual Legacy of the Fmmdi11g
In decisions involving constitutional challenges to nineteenth-century morals the Court regularly invoked some version of Brandeis's "right to be let , • a right that extended beyond spacia l privacy to include a guarantee of · nal autonomy with respect to (among other things) matters touching sex and reproduction. In Stanley v. Crorgia (1969) , for example, the '°"" mvalidatcd a state law making it a crime to possess obscene material.
1'riring for the majority, Justice Thurgood Ma!'lhall reasoned that "a State has _,business telling a man, sirring alone in his own home, what books he may .
-cl or what films he may watch."'° (cnrury-uld laws restricting the sale, distribution, and use of contraceptives met uimilar fate in Griswold v. Connecticm (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1971) .'' MrJiough rarely enforced, contraception bans were dt"termincd by the Warren-era julticcs to violate a constirutionally enshrint-d right to reproductive privacy, a right .,enrually found to be lodged in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.
1bc underlying problem was that Coms1ock-era contraception laws inserted "the _.chincry of the criminal law" into rhe heart of citiz.cns' most intimate adlbotl~hips and personally consequential decisions.•• "If the right of privacy _.., anything,• the Court declared in Eisenstadt, i1 was that citizens were "to lie free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally .&ccung a person as the decision whether ro bear or beget a child.••> Autonomy rationales also figured prominently m a series of contemporaneous decisions that dismantled many longstanding symbols of Protestant cultural IMgcmony. Writing for the Court in Ewrson v. Board of Ed1tcation (1947) , Justice Hugo Black found that the autho!'l of the First Amendmenr llld intended to erct"t a "high and impregnable" "wall of separation" berween church and state. 64 The case turned on the question of whether a local pttnmcnr could use public funds to offset the cost of transponing students to Catholic schools, and a bare majority of the Court answered in the affirmative.
But it was Black's reading of the Establishme1ir Clause -as opposed to the rather incongruous holding -rhat marked the real turning point. Henceforth, the First Amendment would preclude not only the recognition of a national church but YinuaUy any officia I act that might be construed as encouraging citizens ro adopt a particular point of view concerning religion. By the early 196os, the Court had prohibited teacher-led prai•er and Bible reading in the public schools on the grounds that these practices exerted "coercive pressure" on children 10 adopt the religious views of the nujority.'s A similar logic underpinned a subscquem series of religious free exerci!e decisions that granted religious believers the right to demand exemptions from generally applicable laws. Under the doctrine announced in Sherbert v. Verner (1965) , citittns whose ability to practice their chosen faith was "substantially burdened" by a stare or federal law were cntidcd ro relief unless rhe govunmenr could demonstrate that granting an exemption would endanKcr a compelling govcmmemal interest."
In kttping with the theory of the Caro/me Prod11Gls foo1no1e, the mid-century Court was ar its most assertive -and creative -in cases where an individual or group could plausibly claim to have been silenced or disenfranchised by structural incqua litil>s or fla,vs in the nation's rcprc.'Scnrotive system of governmcn1. Indeed, wha1 gives the period's major civil liberties decisions a sense of coherence, even in the face of bitter disagreemem over par1iculars, is 1ha1 rhe Court !ended to read both rhe marketplace and autonomy ideals through the lens of Carole11c Products. Without necessari ly raking a position on the relative importance of liberty and equality as constirurional values, the Coun insis1cd 1ha1 itS institutional role demanded a more robust response 10 alleged civil liberties violations .nvolving traditionally subordinated Americans. Because judicial authority was most legitimate, and thus most poo:nt, in cases whcre the dcmOCTatic proa:ssc:s had gone awry, it was incumbent upon the Coun to pay careful attention to bow authority -whether public, private, or a fusion of the two -was actually experienced by citizens. This would ensure that the marketplace and auronomy ideals were reali1.cd in fact, not just in theory.
The guarantee of an unfettered ideological marketplace, for example, demanded more 1han formal stare neutrality with respect ro a speaker's identity or message. even facially neutral speech regula rions now posed First Amendment problems when their practicol effect was ro diminish expressive opportunities for traditionally subordinated groups. Ordinances banning the distribution of handbills were struck down in part because they outlawed a mode of communication favored by labor organi1ers,Jehovah's Witnesses, and other advocaccs of "poorly financed causes. "' 7 State laws banning picketing or · g labor organizers ro register with rhe srare were similarly problematic,
•i r practical effect was to silence the traditionally disadvantaged side in ing debate over "the desriny of modern mdustrial society. " 68 C..ourt's egalitarian reading of 1he First Amcodmenralso played a critical iD di>maoding the South's racial caste sysrem. As late as the early 196os, officials bad ar their disposal a range of leµI rools that appeared well 10 turmng back challenges to whire supremacy. These included statutes nng the activities of out-of-state corporations, statures barring outside from organizing or funding litigation, and the long-established right of · officials to bring libel suits against group~ or indiv·duals who damaged reputations. Although most of rhesc wols were well wirhin rhe traditional of ...rate and local authority, the Court used the First Amendment to block of 1hcm in turn. In NAACI' v. l'atterson \ 195~) , 1t held that a state could force a civil rights group to disclose its membership rolls where there was to believe rhar group members would face "economic reprisal, loss of yment, [and rhe) threat of physical coercion. ••• Similarly, in NAACP v. (1963) , the O>Urt refused ro "dose firs] eyes to the fact" that facially I laws targeting cbamperry and barrarry -in c-scncc, the stirring up of ous law•uits -were being used to deprive African America11s of the "sole able avenue" by which they migh1 sttk redress for injuries suffered at the of the "politically dominant (whirel community."~ A final landmark ~on, New York Times v. S11//ivan (r964), e\'1sccrated the common law of . . as 1t applied to public officials." In addition 10 setting aside an Alabama I-Y' s $500,000 libel award to a police commissioner who b.ad been criticized in print by a civil rightS group, Sullivan held rhat public officials hoping to win a ~ judgment would henceforth have ro meet the high standard of proving "11C1Ual malice."" Any less stringent standard, 1he majority reasoned, would ... Ye the effect of "chilling First Amendment freedoms in rhe area of race lllations."" Ar rhc same time, die mid-cenniry Court adoptc-d a more deferential approach illcasb where the stare-or, more likely, the federal government-could plausibly claim ro be acting with the aim of mitigating the effects of structural inequality on Amcncan dcm<lctacy. The justices were particularly ~kcptical of claims that the Pint Amendment protected corporate or commercial speakers from the emergent
• lu. thcC<>wt J.du.d in lbomhill v. Alaba.., (t940), rh. Ml cka>1m 1ou1<ndcoosoruoonal
""""""°I<> ubo< pi<Jct<ing. me Jodoc;ary'< l""P<' ruk "°'DUI tu Jd<n<J I.be indusmal "arus with the C'A>ngrc.s and disclose their sources of income were not an affront to First Amendment rights bur rather a reasorutble means of ensuring that "the voice of rhe people" was not "drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatmem while masquerading as proponenrs of the public weal. ··s l.aws rhar made union membership a condition of cmploj•ment in certain industries also surviv<-d First Amendment scrutiny. That some workers should be required to join and contribute to unions followed narurally from rhe reigning Democraric Parry's view rhar collecrive bargaining offered the suresr route to industrial peace. By the r95os, however, critics of organi1.cd labor had seized on the idea rhat mandatory union contributions violated the First Ame11dment by compelling anti-union workers to subsidize expressive activiries rhat they opposed. In International Association of Machinists v. Street (1961) , rhe Cottrt, speaking through justice Brennan, agreed rhar workers could not be compelled ro support political activiry again5t their wills. At the same rime, Brennan found that workers could be required to contribute ro a union, so long as the compelled contributions were used only for core union acrivities such as organizing elections and representing workers in negoriarions with employers. Alrhough the First Amendment offered individual ciriu:ns protection against compelled speech, it also gunranm::d the right of "the majority" of workers to form :rnd opemre a union without "being silenced by the dissenters." Indeed, rhe Court was consrirurionally obligated to balance rhe rights of individua l workers against the right~ of workers as a class, protecting "both interests to the maximum extent possible without b>ctmiuingJ undue impingement of one on the other."
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THE REVOLUTION'S TROUBLED LEGACY
Clearly, the middle decades of the rwentieth cenrury witnessed a significant resrrucruring of American sociery. Srill, rhe question remains: Do these '" Valcnrinc v. Chresrcnsc.n. 316 U.S. 51 :u S4·
.,, U.~. v. Harri""-347 U.S. 6n., 6i.5 (1954) . The l:tw ddincd a "lobhy1i1t .. :u a pcr$0n "receiving any conrrihurions or expending any money"' for the purpose of influcncing the pas$agc or defeat of kgi11l:nic)n. Chief Justice Warren, 1pokfr1g for the m3;ority, agrttd. th;u the :Kt would havt co I>< 1t>d ft3rrowly-as applying only to pood lobbyists who nguluty coos.Uoed wioh mM1btts of Congrns-w survive constitutional JCr'Unny.
.. '''U.S. 7•0. 773 ( 19'1). 93 y significant devclop~enrs amounr to a r~l~tion? If rh.e t~rm implies break with the governmg suucrures and lcgonmanng pnnc1ples of the 81 well as the successful consrruction of new amangements underpinned by rive principles, then it is at least arguable that the Court's adminedly rroarive rulings fell short of this srandard. Indeed, rwo problems -one · al and one theoretical -plagued the mid-cenrury Court's civil liberties dence, foreshadowing rhe eventual unraveling of the post-New Deal sus 011 civil liberties. The prat'tical problem was that the jusrices, aware
Court's limited capaciry w enforce its own decisions, ofren seemed to pull from principled stands when confronted wirh credible threats of d noncompliance. As a result, the "rights revolution" ended with · nt vestiges of the old order still very much in place.
Consider the ill-fated anempt to decouple church and state. The early 196os
• • 0 ns on prayer and Bible reading in the schools made clear that the "wall of rion • metaphor was more rhan empry rhetoric, as did a separate decision lidating religious tesrs for state officeholdc:rs. 11 And yet the Court's rationist reading of the F.sta blishmcnt Clause was never fully marched by loprnenrs 0 11 the ground. The school prayer rulings, in particular, proved llfticult to enforce; a number of contemporary academic studies found that lmlDY public school teachers and administrators simply ignored them. '"Wal ... Tax Ccxnmiuoonof C"yol NtwYock, 3'7 U.S. u,, 67J (1970) .
• Aht.oogh Sunday Milli bws wttt undoubl<dly rdiglom in origin, a majority oi oh< Coun loand 1ha1 they also t<n'ed oht S<CUlar purpose of prottctsngahU'ru' "hcolth, saftty, """" A similar gap between principle and doctrine can be seen in the Court's decisions on sexual and reproductive privacy. In <triking down a Massachusetts law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the Court had seemed to suggest that any official intrusion imo the ~decision wbcdier to ~r or beget a child" was a fundamental violation of petSOnal autonomy. The Court's willingness to issue such a sweeping statement of principle may be explained in part by the fac"t that the nation's contraception laws had all but lapsed into desuetude; in fact, the states that still had such laws on the books defended them by claiming that there was no constitutional injury to redress, since the laws were never enforced. Regulnrion of abortion, in contrast, was alive and well in 1973 when the Court dtoeidcd Roe v. Wade."' This may explain why rhe Court felt it advisable to adopt a more cautious and pragmatic tone in its landmark abortion decision, even as ir broadened the scope of the underlying righr. Whatever the reason, Blackmun and the Roe majority determined rhar the primary problem with abortion resrrictions was not that they interfered wirh privacy in the sense of individual autonomy but rather that they impinged upon the patient-physician relationship. Seen in this light, che consrirurional right to access abortion services had to be balanced against rhe srare's interest in protecting the bealch of the mother and, in the latter stages of pregnancy, the health of the fetus.'' Although R0t's immediate effect was to expand access to abortion services throughout the nation, the medical privacy frame suggested obvious routes by which abortion opponents might narrow, if not negate, rhe right ro terminate a pregnancy.
while ccnainly intended tt;t promote resprt-'t for rdig:iun, were too .. deeply c:n:LbcJJed in the !nation's) hilitory and tt'.&.dition"' to be deemed incompatible with lhc flill&blish.intll t Clause. Manh v. Ohambc.., ~6 ) U.S. 783, 786 (1983 •n•. !Wtnry-live tu« lcgr,J,ru,.. debated sudl laws, and all me ..,., ... ,.. ~ dcfcotcd.
Mo~r. ' " r971~ TO<Crs m rwo SQtes (Michig:an :1nd Nonh lnkou) ddCurd thcr.tpcutic :1bomon rcfonn 1n snlttwiclc rcfcrcncb. Also in t97.i.. the New Yorti: legislature: repealed dut narc'• liberal abort100 law, but the rcpc:tl kgisbrion wic mocd by Governor Ndson Rockefeller.
•' "'The Coun·11 dcci'l1c>n1 rccognjzing a right of privacy also acknowledge that wm.c-state rcgub· tion in areas protected by that right is appropriate . . . A St3.te mjy properly lb:iert imp0rtanr imeresu in s-ifc-guarding hc-.alth, iu maintaining medical standard~ and in protecting potentia1 lift. At some Point in prtg111u1cy, thtse respective interests become su(ficitndy col\\pelling ro sustain regulation ohht faclOrs th:u go,•enl the abortion deci.sion.'" .po U.S. 113, J..H (1973).
· f.i/>erfies and the Dual Legacy of the Fo1111di11g
95 11ic theoretical problem that dogged civil liberties jurisprudence in this period rhc rather murky narure of rhe rclarionship between the Court's civil principles and its egalirarian theory of American democracy. We have that the Court rejected Firsr Amendment challenges to commercial speech nons, lobbying regulations, and union shop agreements. Bur it bears s that ea<:h of these decisions provoked spirited dissents arguing that ... maiority was permitting lawmakers to run roughshod over rights that the O,Urt had earlier declared inviolable. Thu•, a 195 1 decision finding rhat rhe First ,Aondmenr did nor protect door-to-door conunercial solicitation led Justice Jllclc to ask why a salesman hawking subscriptions to the Saturday Evening Pott should be afforded less constirurional protection than a Jehovah's Witness 0t labor organizer engaged in the door·to-door distribution of handbills. In each cue, Black alleged, rhe end result o f rcgularion was to " hobble" the free l:ktulation of "religious or political ideas." aequired labor organizers to regisrer with rhe State. At lcasr to Douglas, it and the regulatory state. As a result, the rights revolution bequea:hed a troubled legacy, leaving ~hind a body of law that was plagued by inremal tensions and, when wielded by justices ot a ditterent ideological stnpe, easily rumed agalll.St its original normative commitments.
MODERN CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE AGE O F INCOH ERENCE
Richard Nixon's viaory in the presidential elcaion of 1968 marke:! the beginning of the end of the rights revolucion. With the nation gripped by urban riots and antiwar protests, Nixon blamed the Court-and its civil liberties ruling1 in particularfor fo>tcring a general spirit of lawlessness. Nixon's fellow Republican, Ronald Reagan, who was elected president in 1980, directed similar co1nplaints at the Court. By the early r98os, the rise of the Christian Right had expanded the list of conservative grievances. In addition to attacking the Courr's record on "law and order" quesrions, Reag;m and other prominent Republicans now promised to appoint justices who would roll back m:cnt rulings on school prayer, abortion, and pomography.
RepublicaJIS would win six of seven presidential contests berween 1968 and 1988. Control of rhe White House provided Republican Pres denrs with an opportunity to ·emake the Coun in their party's image, much as FDR and the Dcmocr11ts had done in the late 19 JOS and early 194os. 17 The emergence in the 19705 of a conservarive legal movemem provided the intellccrual foundation for this effon. 81 Many of the movement's early leaders, including Rohen Bork and Edwin Meese, attacked the Warren Coun for 1gnonng the ongmal intenr (or meaning) of the Constitution's text -noting, for example, that the phrase "right to privacy" appears nowhere in the documem. Others foresaw that Warren-era civil libcrries principles might be applied to conservative ends, such as weakeni ng corporate transparency laws and rolling back ca mpa ign finance regulations. As corporate attorney and future Supreme Coun justice Lewis Powell explained in an inllue111ial 1971 memo, reformers on the left had long ago learned that an "activist Court" was potentia lly "the most importam instrumcni [in our constitutional system) for social, economic and political change.
• It was high time that the nation's corporations applied this lesson in defense of "the free enrerprise system. " definitively rejected the strict scparationist position "that any program which in some manner aids an instimtion with a religious affiliation violares the Establishment Clause"?" Moreover, the amount of money that flowed to religious entities as the indirect result of individual cax write-offs and school voucher programs paled in comparison to the financia l windfall bestowed by the \Volz decision. Seen in this light, the newer programs were not "atypical of existing govemmem programs" that had survived even Justice Hugo Black's exacting scruriny.!i'~ Jn the case of abortion, the Court has mostly stayed above the fray, leaving stare and lower federal COurtS ro sort out the question of whether particular forms of regulation are so onerous as to viola re a woman's right to rc""inate a prcgnancy.
'
As a r:csult, a patdiworl< system of regulation h.,, emerged, with access to abortion servi= varying widely from state to State. In jurisdictions where the lower COUrtS have upheld innovati•e restrictions -from rwenry·four-hour waiting periods to mandatory sonogram procedures 10 laws requiring that abortion providers ha•-c admitting privileges at a nearby hospital -it has become difficult, if nor impossible, for women ro avail themselves of the constitutional right to terminare a pregnancy in its early stages. But while some pushback was certainly to be expected in lighc of the Republican party's >raunch opposition to abortion, the movement to restrict access could hardly have proceeded so smoothly absent the Roe majority's decision to ( 1) frame the issue in the language of medical privacy and ( 1) adopt a balancing approach to health and safety regulacious. Like che landmark mid-ceurury Establislunenc Clause decisions, in other words, Roe left in place significant vestiges of the rraditional regulatory structure, which in tum provided abortion oppont-nrs with convenient launching points for anacks on the underlying constitutional right. 94 5 388, 191 (1983 At the level of doctrine, these decisions are firmly roo:ed in the great mid· llDIUTY free spttch and privacy precedents. B111 d0ctrine alone cannot explain w1iy rhe Court, in these particular ca.cs, elected to adv~nce the legacy of the risbn revolution. A fuller expl"":auon would ~ by noung ~t many of these _ . , 10 conrra<r to the abortton and church-stare cases, involve fo""s of ,...Urory authority that were thoroughly discredited during the heyday of the Wancn Court. In che case of free spcxch, three decades of First Ameodmeot ~ insisting upon the viewpoint neutrality of sptteh regulations had by the . . . nf rh~ C.ourt's rightward shih effectively stripped stares and localities of the tbiliry 10 discriminate for or againsc particular speakers, even when the speakers or ideas in question are reviled by mainstream society. 98 To be sure, obscene lpeech remained theoretically beyond the scope of First Amendment protection, llul this category had been narrowed almosc to oblivion: works that did not depict explicit sexual acts or that possessed some semblance of " literary, artistic, political or sciemific value" were by the late 1970s beyond the reach of the mison.99 Any artempt to revive the govermnent's traditional role in policing public discouri>e would have involved far more than ovenuming a single wayward precedent; it would have meant uprooting a doctrinal framework diat had been conscructcd over several decades and char appeared co enjoy TOO broad public support -at least in che abstract. In this area, where doctrinal vestiges were few and far berween, even the Court's most conservative members have generally embraced the inherited framework, and even in the most conrroversia I of cases. '
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To be sure, the Rehnquist Court narrowly affirmed the conscirucionality of state-level sodomy bans as late as 1986. Bur the more important point to note about the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick is that a generally conservative Court c.1me within a single vote of extending constitutional protection to samesex intimacy at a time when many in the Republican party viewed homosexuality as a dire 1hrcnt to the moral and physical health of the nation. ' 0 ' The 5-4 decision, with two Republic.1n appoimees in 1he majority a nd a third only narrowly dissuaded from joining them, testified to the difficulty of reconciling sodomy prosecutions with the major privacy precedents of the 1960s and r97os. ' 0 " If the Court's earlier rulings had fo und that private, consensual, noncommercial sexual conduct was generally beyond the reach of the state, it was difficult to see why homosexual conduct should be excluded from the scope of the rule. Moreover, by the r98os, it was clear tha1 laws prohibiting sodomy, like the earlier bani. on contraception, were enforced only rarely and often in an arbitrary and vindictive man.nt"r. ' 0 3 As in Crirwold, a strong case could be made tha1 desuetude principles alone provided sufficient grounds for an opinion invalidating the nation's anti-sodomy laws.'"" That Bowers was overruled only scvenreen years after it was handed down was due in no small part 10 the cffons of the many acrivisis who, in the intervening years, buih a constirutioo.al case for rever~I and cultivated public support for decriminalizarion.' 0 ' But it surely does these acrivim no disservice to suggesr that rhey were aided by the gradual erosion, over the preceding fou r decades, o f the states' powers of morals police. lur it is the third line of cases that is perhaps the most interesting. In cases g corporate speakers, rhe Burger, Rehnquist, and RobertS Courts have iastically embraoed the ideals of unfettered public discourse and personal > that undergirded so much of the mid-century Court's civil liberties nee. But instead of wielding rbcsc ideals in the sernce of a m<)rc an society, i1 has used them to dismantle key features of the regulatory • The first signs of a shift came in Virginia Sl4te Board of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Co,.ncil (1976) , when the Court extended First ment protection to commercial speech. Lf one purpose of the First ment was to promote rhe "societa l interest in the fullest possible ination of information," then the Court could sec no reason why kers should be stripped of constitutional protectiori merely because the rrnation they hoped to convey was commercial in nature. '°" On this point, Court's remaining liberals agreed with the recent Republican appointees: the · -ccnrury Court had erred when it permitted lawmakers tO restrict speech yon the basis of ics commercial contcn1. Sharp disagreements arose, however, when the Court began ro consider the pease extent of corporate and commercial First Amendment rights. At bottom, *rift concerned the relationship between civil liberties and c-conomic power.
.. ca~ involving corporate speakers, the Court's conservative justic.es rended • ircat the: marketplace and autonomy ideals as absrracr commands: more lflCCh was always better than less, regardless of who was speaking; and .-reed spccch was always consriruriooally problcmaric, even when the carger tlfcotrc1on was a corporation and even when 1hc: information in question was 4'monstrably crue. In contrast, the Court's liberals 1ended 10 adhere to the Warttn-era view that civil liberties principles were nor to be interpreted in ways . ., reinforced structural Oa ws in the narion 's representative system of pernment.
In Fim Nalional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ( 1978) , for example, a bare majority GlllliSting entirely of Republican appointees Struck down a Massachusetts law . . , banned corporations from attempring to influence ballot initiatives "unless *corporation's business interests were directly involved." Relying heavily on the -itcrplace metaphor, justice Lewis Powell's majority opinion declared that "the illicttnt worth of ... spctth in terms of its capacity for informing the public" was -'kctcd by "the identify of its source, whether corporation, association, union, ar indn idual. """ In contrast, three Democratic appointees and William llbnquist, a Nixon appointee, would h3'e held th.u the law was a permissible means of preventing corporations from dominaring the airwavc'S and directing shareholder mor>ey to political causes that were only tangcntiaUy related to th., corporation's bottom line. Far from distoning public discourse, Massachusetts was attempting to preserve the historic "role of the Hrst Amendment as a guaranror of a fr« marketplace of ideas."'""
Although the Bellott; majority found that the First Amendmem protected the right of corporations tu influence elections, the precise scope of chis right was left undefined. Some language in the opinion suggested that regulations narrowly targeted at the avoidance of corruption (or irs appearance) would survive first Amendment scrutiny. And a subsequent 1990 decision upheld a state law thar barred corporations from using treasury funds (as opposed to political action committee funds) for political purposes.
• 09 As a result, an uneasy truce held for the next three decades. Under the federal Election Campaign Act and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BC RA), the size of direct contr ibutions to candidates, parties, and political action committees was limited, and corporate and union expenditures were channeled through political action committees. Independent expenditures were also subject to rules designed to prevent corporations and unions from circumventing contribution limits by cutting ads on behalf of specific candidates. First Amendment protects the right of corporations t0 spend unlimited amounts from their corporate treasuries to influence campaigns, provided they do not coordinate their expenditures with a particular candidate. " 0 As in Bellotti, the marketplace metaphor ttndergirded much of the majority opinion. According to Justice Kennedy, laws restricting political spending by corporations dismrtcd the ideological marketplace by depriving average Americans of information they might want or need to bear. To be sure, corporarions possessed the capacity ro dominate the airwa»cs in ways that average citiuns could never hope to match. l\ut 1~1s fact was irrel~ant sit11;e, 1mder the marketplace theory, the public could be counted on t0 i.cp;tratt the wheat from the chaff.''' 1°' ibid. it 810-Whnt. j .
• chssenung. "'the C".ovcrnmcnt prcwnti(sl their voices and viewpoints from "aching the public and ad'lising voccrs on which pcrloon!I ot'c:ntitiesarc hostile to their intere$U .. , f1ctiom 1hould be checked by ptrmining rhcm :all tn .speak 1 and by entrusting the people rC> judge wh1u is trut and what is f:alsc.'" A subM:qucnt lower court decision, folJ owing Citiuns U11i1ed tO its logic11J conclusion, · Liberties and the Dual l,egacy of the fou11di11J( 103 1be impact of the Court's corporate speech dcci,ions was not confined to the of campaign finance. Following Virginia Board and Bell-01ti, the number of Amendment challenges co corporate transparency and disclosure laws eml -as did the odds of success. In recent years, roughly half of all Amendment decisions handed down at the federal appellate level have ed business corporations and trade groups a~ opposed to individuals and · 'onal exprcssi»c assodations.
•u More to the point, the resulting decisioos cut to the very core of the regulatory sratt. To list but a few exampks, tions have successfully advanced First Amendment speech challenges to prohibiting the buying and selling, without consent, of patient prescription by data mining and pharmaceutical companies,''> regulations requiring that kh claims used to market food products be supported by at least "'° randomly comrolled trial srudies,',. regulations requiring companies to osc their use of "conflict minerals,""' and regulations requiring t0bacco tlJlllpanies to display graphic warning lahcl• on packs of cigarettes. "
6
The autonomy principle and the corollary prohibition against compelled speech liPe proved particularly useful in chis reg.1rd. In its opinion upholding the right o f ..i-xo companies to refuse to incl ode graphic warning labels on their products, for jolm W. Co1tip1o,, that the government "may not prohibit the dis5eminarion of ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves."' "
In decisions such as Virginia Board, Citizens Uniud, and I lams v. Quinn, the rcconsriruted Court has dealt a series of signilicanr blows to the rcgularory stare, but nOt by challenging its authority head-on. Rather, rhe Coun's conscrvati~ majority has conceded the legitimacy of the underlying power (e.g., to regulate campaign finance, to m3lldate corporate transparr-ncy, to impose collective bargaining arrangements}, only to rendeL regulation impractical through an expansive inrcrpn:tation of the First Amendment rights of individuals and corporations. Adding to the irony, it has done so using the very doctrines that the mid-century Court used to dismantle the various state and local prerogatives that had long relega1ed workers and minori1ies to a subordinate position in American society. To be sure, as Justice Aliro acknowledged in his o pinion for rhe Harris majority, previous Courts had repeatedly rebuffed first Amendment challenges tO the regulatory state. But these ea rl ier precedents were not binding upon rhe prese111 Court, Alico insisted, as they were the "result of historical accident, not careful application of principles." '
10
CONCLUSION
This last remark from J usticc Alito, with its juxraposirion of "principles" and "historical accidems," might well serve as the epitaph for the past cenrury of constirurional development in the area of civil liberties. Since at least the New Deal period, it has been the aspiration of judges and commentators alike to liberate citi.ccns from arbitrary authority strucnires bequeathed by their forebears. During this period, constitutiona l interpreters have generally agreed thnt if official authority is co survive constitutional scrutiny, it should not be because of the judge's irrational prejudice in fovor of the familiar but rather because the rights claimant has misunderstood o r missta ted the nature of the principle at stake -whether the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, or the right to privacy. The problem -and the explanation for much of the incoherence of recent civil liberties doctrine -is rhat the distinction between a "historical accident" and a proper "application of principles• often lies in the eye of the beholder.
"' !71 U.S.
